Where we're going, we don't need commands.

Stock distributions ship hundreds of packages no one would consciously add to a trusted computing base if asked one at a time. Mini is a small Rust PID 1, a Linux kernel, and your workload binary — and that's the list.

If we can't justify it for the attestation report, it isn't in the image.

The enclave already isolates the workload from the host. Stacking containerd inside the VM rebuilds namespaces and cgroups at the layer where you most need to read every line. Workloads run as plain processes.

Isolation primitives belong outside what we're trying to attest.

Every byte was decided at build time. The image you boot is the image you measure. There's nothing to apt-get inside a running enclave because the enclave isn't a place to install software — it's a place to run a workload you already shipped.

You don't ssh into a confidential VM. The point of one is that the operator cannot see in. Control happens through one local unix socket inside the guest, gated by a boot-time token that nobody outside the VM ever sees.

If your runbook ends in ssh in and check, you've already failed the threat model.

The control plane is newline-delimited JSON over a unix socket. There is no public HTTP surface to scan, fingerprint, or 0-day. Anything that talks out, talks out from the workload itself, on its terms.

Boot. Attest. Run a workload binary. That's the entire posture. Everything else was a build-time decision baked into a measured, reproducible image — readable end-to-end.

Where we're going, we don't need a runbook.